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Abstract
Why do soft budget constraints exist and persist? In this paper we
argue that the prevalence of soft budget constraints can be best ex-
plained by the political desirability of softness. We develop a political
economy model where politicians cannot commit to policies that are
not ex post optimal. We show that because of the dynamic commit-
ment problem inherent in the soft budget constraint, politicians can
in essence commit to make transfers to entrepreneurs which otherwise
they would not be able to do. This encourages such entrepreneurs to
vote for them. Though the soft budget constraint may induce eco-
nomic ine¢ ciency, it may be politically rational because it inuences
the outcomes of elections. In consequence, even when information
is complete, politicians may fund bad projects which they anticipate
they will have to bail out in the future.
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1 Introduction
Traditional policy analysis in the tradition of Pigou (1920) and Samuelson
(1954) saw policymakers as designing policies to solve market failures, or
satisfy normative criteria, subject only to the availability of resources and
the nature of preferences and technology. In the 1970s economists began
to realize that even well intentioned planners were subject to other types of
constraints. Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) examined the nature of optimal
policies without lump-sum taxation, and Gibbard (1973) and Green and
La¤ont (1979) argued that the incentive compatibility constraints generated
by private information had to be respected. Kydland and Prescott (1977)
also showed that optimal inter-temporal policies might be time inconsistent,
making it di¢ cult for a planner to commit to even a second-best policy. In the
1980s and 1990s economists began to merge such ideas with models where
policymakers were self-interested and studied how the interaction between
such interests and social welfare led to further deviations from rst or second-
best outcomes.
These models have brought us much closer to an understanding of the
relationship between market failures and political failures. We have begun
to develop intuitions for the circumstances in which policy outcomes will
deviate from welfare optima and the types of phenomena that are typically
associated with political failure. For example, we now have well developed
political mechanisms which can account for why governments redistribute
income using ine¢ cient instruments.1 We also have carefully articulated
ideas about how political institutions help determine equilibrium policies.2
Yet many puzzles remain. A central, and fascinating one, is that of the
soft budget constraint.Originally introduced by Kornai (1979) in the con-
text of centrally planned economies, the basic notion is that governments and
policymakers are unable to impose a hardbudget constraint on government
owned enterprises or government agencies. In consequence such enterprises
or agencies have incentives to act in ine¢ cient or proigate ways knowing
that they will be bailed out if things go wrong.
1See Coate and Morris (1995), Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997), and Acemoglu
and Robinson (2001).
2See Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997, 2000), Persson and Tabellini (2000, 2004).
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Since its development, the problem of the soft budget constraint has been
recognized to be endemic to all polities, though clearly being worse in de-
veloping economies. This recognition emerges from the fact that all scholars
note that soft budget constraints in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Republic proved more long lived that central planning. Maskin and Xu (2001,
p. 10) report that considerable empirical work indicates that the soft budget
constraint syndrome continues to play an important role in virtually every
transition economy, even those that have already undergone many years of
reform. Similarly, Kornai, Maskin and Roland (2003, p. 1114) note that
Ironically, the transition experience suggests that soft budget constraints
have persisted amongst the economies of Eastern Europe in the initial phases
of transition, despite vigorous declarations on the need for hardening.
Why do soft budget constraints exist and persist? The central argument
in the literature is that soft budget constraints arise because politicians can-
not commit not to renance bad projects ex post and cannot distinguish bad
from good ex ante. Given that a project is launched, it will be renanced as
long as benets cover costs. Previous costs are sunk. Entrepreneurs know
this, and submit bad projects for nancing in the rst place. This is the
key argument in Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), which has become the
canonical model of soft budget constraints. This approach follows the liter-
ature which built on Kydland and Prescott (1977) where policymakers were
though of as well intentioned and thus downplays any political reason for the
existence of soft-budget constraints.
Such an approach to understanding the soft budget constraint is odd,
because the overwhelming amount of evidence strongly suggests the role of
political motivations. For instance, political scientists who have studied this
topic, argue that the main reason for soft budget constraints to persist is that
soft budget constraints serve the interests of politicians - this is precisely the
reason they are not dismantled.
In this paper we develop a fully political economy model of the soft budget
constraint. Our starting point, following Alesina (1988), Osborne and Slivin-
ski (1996), and Besley and Coate (1997), is that politicians cannot commit
to policies that are not ex post optimal for them to adopt. This inability to
commit to arbitrary policies hampers the ability of politicians to exchange
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policies for support, since voters do not necessarily believe election promises
(unlike in the basic Downsian model where perfect commitment is assumed).
Such a political setting is the natural one if one accepts that the problem of
the soft-budget constraint is a problem of commitment. Instruments which
solve this credibility problem are therefore potentially attractive politically.
We argue that the key thing about the soft budget constraint is that, in ef-
fect, it is a credible way of transferring income to potential supporters. The
central observation is that because a policymaker cannot commit to enforce
a hard budget constraint, he can commit to make transfers to citizens.
Nevertheless, this in itself does not make a soft-budget constraint po-
litically rational. Instruments which allow all politicians to make credible
commitments to policy are not necessarily attractive unless they improve the
position of one politician relative to another. For example, politicians would
like to be able to o¤er income redistribution to groups to win their support.
In order for this o¤er to change the expected outcome of an election, such
redistribution has to satisfy two conditions (1) it must be optimal ex post for
politicians to enact, and (2) it must be something that all politicians cannot
o¤er.3
Such asymmetries arise in many natural ways. Politicians di¤er in their
valuation of welfare of di¤erent groups, in their ability to undertake di¤erent
policies, in their regional attachment, and in their interaction with di¤erent
groups. We model such di¤erences in the same way as Dixit and Londregan
(1996) who argue that (p. 1134) Such di¤erences can arise when each party
has its core support groups of constituents whom it understands well. This
greater understanding translates into greater e¢ ciency in the allocation of
benets: patronage dollars are spend more e¤ectively.
In this paper we argue that it is the combination of these two things that
leads to the prevalence of the soft-budget constraint. Politicians are happy
to nance projects which are known to be bad in the sense that revenues do
not cover costs and which they anticipate that they will nd it optimal ex
3Consider the standard probabilistic voting model of political competition where two
political parties design credible policy platforms to maximize either the probability of
winning an election or expected utility. The usual outcome is that both parties win with
probability 12 . Because both parties have access to the same instruments, in equilibrium
these completely o¤set themselves and do not inuence the expected election outcome.
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post to bail outin the future. This is because such bail outsredistribute
resources to people or groups to whom they would otherwise nd it di¢ cult
to redistribute to credibly and to whom other politicians cannot credibly
redistribute resources. We refer to such groups as the core supporters of a
politician. We show that the key di¤erence between such bad projects and
good projects is that all politicians can commit to renance good projects ex
post and thus although they may redistribute resources to voters, they do so
symmetrically and therefore do not give any politician a strategic advantage.
The ability of incumbent politicians to launch projects that only they
can credibly renance in the future creates an incumbency bias. Moreover,
it introduces an interesting inter-temporal structure to the model. If an
incumbent politician launches a project today which only he can renance
tomorrow, this encourages his core supporters to vote for him because they
anticipate that he will bail them out tomorrow, thus increasing their utility.
In addition, if such a politician gets re-elected then he can launch further
projects in the next period which payo¤ in the period after that. This further
increases the benet to core supporters from re-electing the politician. To
capture these inter-temporal e¤ects we develop an innite horizon election
model.
While in Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) the soft budget constraint is
something politicians would want to escape if they credibly could, in our
model the soft budget constraint may arise as something politicians desire
even when information is complete. Many case studies point out that soft
budget constraints may serve political purposes. For instance, Gimpelson
and Treisman (2002) nd that in Russia (p. 172) regional governments
boost public employment by hiring partisans and clients and extract greater
federal aidand that (p. 178) Central politicians responded with bailouts
because they knew, too, that regional voters would, quite rationally, have
punished them if they did not. Kitschelt et al. (1999) discuss the wide-
spread use of clientelistic policies in post-communist countries. One example
is Bulgaria where politicians build clientelistic networks (p. 203) especially
in the sectors of state-run enterprises and collectivized agricultureand where
quasi-private business groups in the BSPs sphere of supporters successfully
extracted cheap credits from a compliant government-controlled central bank
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... and sold foreign commodities at high world market prices to unavailable,
debt-accumulating state-owned companies. These scholars see the soft bud-
get constraint as arising out of a clientelistic exchange of redistribution for
political support.
The politics of soft budget constraints and patronage is not, however,
unique to eastern European transition economies. A large number of studies
emphasize such political strategies are prevalent in African countries. The
rst European colony in Africa that became independent was Ghana in 1957.
The Nkrumah government launched a policy of active involvement in the
economy where according to Rimmer (1969, p. 195) New enterprises were
distributed among party functionaries as private efs, enabling them to give
patronage to relatives, friends and supporters. Killick (1978, p. 194) notes
that for the state farms created managers were often political appointees
knowing little of agriculture. The economic e¤ects of the policy of patronage
was disastrous; the public budget decit skyrocketed and the massive public
investments did not yield any payo¤ in terms of increased growth. Killick
(1978, p. 248) argues that to understand the poor economic development in
Ghana one need to ask
why the creation of new state enterprises was allowed to out-
strip the resources devoted to project planning, why incompetent
managers were tolerated and why interfering politicians were not
disciplined.
He goes on to argue that
Political interferenceemerges as a logical result of the use
of state enterprises to reward party activists and to extend the
area of political control. And inattention to economic e¢ ciency
in the planning and operation of enterprises becomes explicable
if the creation of such enterprises is accepted as an end in itself
and as an ostentatious display to impress the electorate.
Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2002) argue that a politically driven soft budget
constraint has played a central role the catastrophic economic performance
of Burundi since independence. In the period 1977-82 about 100 state owned
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companies were created whose main role was to transfer rents to political
supporters. Although (p. 24) most of the corporations experienced cash ow
problems accommodated with massive injections of subsidiesthey continued
to receive nancing and by 1990 state rms accounted for 31 percent of
formal sector employment, 25 percent of outstanding domestic credit, and
beneted from 3.4 percent of GDP in nancial ows from the government.
The public nancing continued even longer and By 1995, equity capital
for thirty-six such rms with majority state participation represented 20
percent of the countrys GDP, but overall, these corporations posted a net
loss equivalent to 6 percent of GDP or 14 percent of government revenue.4
Political motivations for the soft budget constraint have previously been
proposed by Shleifer and Vishny (1994), Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996),
and Desai and Olofsgård (2005), who assume political benets of excess labor
in public rms that result in soft budget constraints. In our model political
benets are not assumed to exist but emerge as a result.5 Ine¢ cient spend-
ing in our model does not result from a common pool problem as in e.g.
Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981) or Persson and Tabellini (1994), since
in our model the decision maker faces the full costs of his own spending.
Our model is related to models where the incumbent chooses policy to bind
his own hands in order to inuence the outcome of an election (e.g., Milesi-
Ferretti, 1995). As in such papers we study a dynamic model of voting and
commitment. Finally, our model is related to Dixit and Londregan (1995)
where agents do not undertake e¢ cient investments because politicians can-
not commit not to tax away the future prots by these investments. In our
model politicians choose policy today to be able to commit to policy in the
future.
4For other African examples see Barkan and Chege (1989) on Kenya, Tangri (1999) on
Zambia, and Hayward (1987).
5Shleifer and Vishny (1994), and Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996) have no political
competition or voting in their models. Desai and Olofsgård (2005) assume that some voters
cannot observe which policies are being implemented to increase employment, making it
attractive for incompetent politicians to increase employment through subsidies. In a
similar vein Coate and Morris (1995) explain how ine¢ cient redistribution may emerge in
a political equilibrium when voters do not know for sure if the implemented policies are
e¢ cient or ine¢ cient. In contrast our model has complete information.
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2 A model of politically e¢ cient soft budget
constraints
We consider an innite horizon economy with two politicians A and B and a
unit mass of entrepreneurs that are also the voters. The starting point of our
model is the two period model of the soft budget constraint in Dewatripont
and Maskin (1995). Entrepreneurs have no capital themselves and submit
projects for nancing to the politician in power. Projects generate observable
returns that the politician can completely extract. short-term projects yield
payo¤ Rs in the same period they are undertaken while long-term projects
yield payo¤Rl one period after being launched. Whether short-term or long-
term, projects require one unit of capital per period they are nanced.
By holding power politicians receive some exogenous rents X, get the
eventual returns on projects net of investment costs, and have the right to
decide policy. We model the transfers from politicians to voters required
to nance a project in the same way as Dixit and Londregan (1996), where
transfers occur via a leaky bucket and where this leakage depends on the
group and the party. Parties have their di¤erent core support groups that
they understand better and can deliver benets to with greater e¢ ciency.
To transfer one unit of capital to a core support group a politician requires
1 + ' units of resources, while to transfer a unit of capital to other groups
a politician requires 1 +  units of resources; ' <  < 1. Without loss
of generality for our model we simplify the Dixit-Londregan formulation by
setting ' = 0. Each politician has a fraction p  1
2
of the voters in his core
support group, while a fraction 1   2p of the voters do not belong in any
core support group.6 All voters freely decide who to support and thus even
members of the core group of a politician have to be persuaded to vote for
him, they do not automatically do so.7
6An alternative interpretation of partisan politics is that politicians care di¤erently
about the wellbeing of di¤erent voters, so that the net cost of transferring resources to own
core supporters is lower than for transferring resources to other voters. This produces an
asymmetry between politicians which has similar implications (see Robinson and Torvik,
2005).
7We abstract from any other type of policy instrument in the analysis. Note however
that if politicians had access to transfers, since we shall analyze only Markov perfect
equilibria, they would not be able to credibly promise to use them to gain support. Once
in power, since politicians only care about their own welfare, they would not redistribute
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Es is an entrepreneursper period private benet (income) of a short-
term project if nanced, and El is the nal period private benet of a long-
term project if renanced. If projects are not initiated or terminated the
benet is zero. Thus Es; El > 0. Politicians and voters (entrepreneurs) have
a discount factor  2 (0; 1) and all agents aim to maximize the expected
present discounted value of utility. As in Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and
Dixit and Londregan (1996) voters also have preferences over ideology. Each
voter j has an ideological (per period) bias j toward politician A. We assume
that j is uniformly distributed on the interval [  1
2s
; 1
2s
] with density s > 0,
and that ideological preferences remain constant over time. Each individual
is also subject to an aggregate shock in favor of politician A, denoted  ,
which is a random variable uniformly distributed on the interval [  1
2h
; 1
2h
]
with density h > 0 (and measured in next period utility units). Each period
a new drawing from the popularity distribution is undertaken independently
of the popularity shock of the previous period. Letting E denote the per
period private economic benet of voter j, the full expected next period (per
period) utility of voter j is given by
E + jD (1)
where D is a dummy variable that takes the value of unity if politician A is
in power and zero otherwise (and the expected value of  is zero). Thus we
employ a standard probabilistic voting model based on Lindbeck and Weibull
(1987) and Dixit and Londregan (1996). A di¤erence is that we extend the
probabilistic model to consider an innite horizon economy, and show that,
at least in our setting, this generates a relatively tractable model.
2.1 Policies
We characterize the pure strategy Markov perfect equilibria of the model.
In a Markov equilibrium actions at a given play of the stage game can only
be conditioned on the state of the game at that point and not the entire
history of play. Here the state of the game is captured by the identity of
the incumbent politician and the identity of the politician in power in the
previous period. The restriction to Markov perfect equilibria implies that
any income to citizens.
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strategies played within a period must be subgame perfect which means that
all actions must be credible. This introduces the problem of commitment in
a natural way. Therefore, voters realize that for policies to be implemented
they have to be ex post optimal for the chosen politician. Politicians cannot
credibly commit to policies which are not in their own interest. The timing
of the stage game in period t as follows.
1. At the start of the period whichever politician won the last election
takes power.
2. He must decide whether or not to re-nance any long-run projects
launched in period t  1:
3. He must decide what new short-run or long-run projects to nance in
period t.
4. Agents receive their period t payo¤s.
5. At the end of the period an election takes place and voters vote.
We consider both poor and good projects (entrepreneurs). Poor projects
are projects that do not yield a positive return. Thus for poor short-term
projects Rs < 1 for a core supporter and Rs < 1+ for a non-core supporter,
while for poor long-term projects Rl < 1 +  for a core supporter and
Rl < (1 + )(1 + ) for others. Here 1 +  is the present discounted cost of
a project operated by a member of the core group of a politician and Rl is
the present discounted revenues. Projects that do not fulll these inequalities
are termed good projects.8
We start out with poor projects. It is immediately clear that poor short-
term projects will not be nanced in any period. Such projects are loss
making and with forward looking voters they do not a¤ect the reelection
probability. Thus there is no reason to undertake them. Voters realize this,
and promises to fund future short-term loss making projects are not credible.
8Note that these conditions are not the same as those for social e¢ ciency. These would
also include the benets to the entrepreneurs, the Es; El. Nevertheless, the interesting
feature of the soft-budget constraint seems to be to understand how policymakers fund
loss making enterprises and the private benets are not relevant to whether or not a project
make losses for the government since they cannot be expropriated.
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We now turn to poor long-term projects. The politician who wins an
election must decide if such projects should be launched, as well as if existing
projects should be terminated or renanced. We start out by considering the
following equilibrium strategies: when in power a politician launches long-
term poor projects with 1 < Rl < 1 +  for his core supporters only and he
renances core supporters only. We term this policy l. Note that policy l
is symmetric in the sense that both politicians act in the same way towards
their core supporters, and against the core supporters of the other politician.
We study the appropriate Bellman equations, and later we show that policy
l is the only possible equilibrium path where poor long-term projects are
nanced.
Whether or not launching poor long-term projects is an equilibrium de-
pends on the availability of good short and long-term projects, since these
inuence the benets from being in power. However, since the e¤ects of
payo¤s from such good projects are identical to the e¤ects of X in the Bell-
man equations below we do not explicitly introduce the payo¤s from good
projects. We return to the ramications of good projects later.
In general, dene V ik (m; l) as the return to politician i = A;B when
politician k = A;B was the incumbent in the previous period, politician
m = A;B wins the election, and politicians follow policy l. Let (l) denote
the reelection probability of an incumbent following policy l. This reelection
probability will be endogenously determined below and shown to be inde-
pendent of who was the incumbent in the previous period. 1   (l) is the
probability for an opposition politician to win the election under under policy
l.
Consider rst the case where politician A wins the election. If politician B
was the previous incumbent, the static payo¤to politician A as a consequence
of winning the election is the rents of power X net of the unit nancing cost
for the p entrepreneurs in his core support group that he launches long-term
poor projects for. If reelected for the next period the politician gets V AA (A; l),
while otherwise he gets V AA (B; l). Hence his payo¤ is
V AB (A; l) = X   p+ 
 
(l)V AA (A; l) + (1  (l))V AA (B; l)

: (2)
When politician A was the incumbent and wins the election his core sup-
porters will be renanced. Thus in this case the rst period static payo¤ to
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the incumbent also includes the return Rl net of the renancing cost for his
p core supporters.
V AA (A; l) = p(Rl   1) +X   p+ 
 
(l)V AA (A; l) + (1  (l))V AA (B; l)

= V AB (A; l) + p(Rl   1); (3)
where the second line follows immediately from (2).
Should politician B win the election the next period the static payo¤
for politician A is zero regardless of whether he was the incumbent or not,
as he receives neither rents nor payo¤s from projects. Furthermore, when
politician B wins the election the next election probability of politician A
becomes that of an opponent; 1  (l). Hence we have(2)
V AA (B; l) = V
A
B (B; l) = 
 
(1  (l))V AB (A; l) + (l)V AB (B; l)

: (4)
From (2), (3) and (4) we then nd
V AB (A; l) =
(1  (l)) (X   p+ (l)p(Rl   1))
1   ( + 2(l)(1  )) : (5)
Symmetric equations hold for politician B.
Note that poor long-term projects are always economically loss making
to initiate; the expected payo¤ of a project is  1+(l)(Rl 1) which must
always be negative when Rl < 1 + . However, they can still be politically
e¢ cient and to show this we proceed to determine (l).
There are three groups of voters - the two groups of core supporters each
of size p and the group of voters of size 1 2p that are not core supporters of
either politician. For simplicity we assume that all members of the core group
of either politician have access to bad long-term projects. Intuitively, it is
only these projects which will inuence the election outcome since they will
only be re-nanced by one of the politicians. Good short-term or good long-
term projects will be nanced (and re-nanced) by both types of politician
and will therefore not inuence the election outcome. This being the case
for the moment we do not include the possible payo¤s from good projects in
the Bellman equations below.
Consistent with the notation above, let UAA (B; l) denote the return to a
core supporter of politician A (superscript) when politician A (subscript) was
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the previous incumbent and politician B wins the election. The expected fu-
ture value of the aggregate shock  is zero. Consider a voter with ideological
bias j in the core support group of politician A. If politician A is the incum-
bent his next period the expected static payo¤ is El + 
j if the incumbent
is reelected. Furthermore the present incumbent will also be the next period
incumbent with the reelection probability (l),while the probability of losing
the election will be 1  (l). Thus
UAA (A; l) = El + 
j + 
 
(l)UAA (A; l) + (1  (l))UAA (B; l)

: (6)
In case the incumbent loses, a core supporter of politician A is not re-
nanced and since we measure the ideological bias in favor of politician A,
his next period expected static return is zero. Furthermore, the probability
that politician A wins the next election is the probability that an opposition
politician wins, namely 1  (l). Thus
UAA (B; l) = 
 
(1  (l))UAB (A; l) + (l)UAB (B; l)

: (7)
In case politician B is the current incumbent the expected payo¤s are
UAB (A; l) = U
A
A (A; l)  El (8)
and
UAB (B; l) = U
A
A (B; l): (9)
Consider rst the case where politician A is the incumbent. The expected
future net gain in utility of a core supporter of politician A if A is reelected
is
UAA (A; l)  UAA (B; l) =
(1 + (1  (l)))El + j
1  (2(l)  1) : (10)
Consider next the case where politician B is the incumbent. In this case
the net gain for a group A core supporter should politician A rather than
politician B win the election is given by
UAB (A; l)  UAB (B; l) =
(l)El + 
j
1  (2(l)  1) (11)
Note that the right hand side of (10) is higher then the right hand side
of (11). This is intuitive. The di¤erence between them stems from the fact
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that if A is the incumbent then he chooses to implement long-run projects in
the current period. This implies that if he wins the election then a member
of his core group will get El next period. In addition if A wins today he
will initiate further long-run projects in the next period, which are again
renanced should he also win the next election, and so on. However, if B is
in power in the previous period, then even if A wins today, since no long-
run projects benetting members of As core group will have been started
in the previous period, there cannot be any payo¤ El in the next period.
However, if A wins today he will initiate long-run projects in the next period,
generating future benets. This argument explains why the right hand side
of (10) is higher than the right side of (11). This immediately implies that
the reelection probability (l) will be di¤erent from the election probability
of an opposition politician, 1  (l).
The symmetric equations for core supporters of politician B can easily be
found (remembering that j is dened as the ideological bias toward politician
A). Also, by inserting El = 0, the corresponding equations for non-core
supporters can be found.
We then reach the following proposition:
Proposition 1 A strategy where the politician in power launches poor long-
term projects with 1 < Rl < 1 +  for core supporters only, and renances
core supporters only, increases his reelection probability.
Proof. Assume that politician A is the incumbent. Denote by NAA
the number of core supporters of the incumbent that also vote for him.
From (10) we know that those politician A core supporters that vote for
politician A are those with a higher ideological bias than the j dened by
 = [1+(1 (l))]El+
j
1 (2(l) 1) . N
A
A is then given by
p
Z 1
2s
 (1+(1 (l)))El (1 (2(l) 1)) 
sdi
= p

1
2
+ s (1 + (1  (l)))El + s (1  (2(l)  1)) 

(12)
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The number of core supporters of politician B that vote for the incumbent
A is given by
NBA = p
Z 1
2s
(l)El (1 (2(l) 1)) 
sdi
= p

1
2
  s(l)El + s (1  (2(l)  1)) 

(13)
The number of non-core supporters that vote for the incumbent, NA, is given
by
NA = (1  2p)
Z 1
2s
 [1 (2(l) 1)] 
sdi
= (1  2p)

1
2
+ s (1  (2(l)  1)) 

(14)
The reelection probability, (l), is given by
(l) = Pr

NAA +N
B
A +NA 
1
2

which can be simplied to
(l) = Pr f   pElg = 1
2
+ phEl >
1
2
(15)
Consider next the case where politicians do not nance any projects. In
this case the post election income of all entrepreneurs is independent of the
election outcome. The reelection probability can then easily be shown to be
1
2
, and the proposition follows.
The reelection probability is a¤ected in three ways by nancing long-term
poor projects for core supporters. First, the reelection probability of the in-
cumbent politician A increases as the next period income for core supporters
of A is higher if he rather than the opposition politician B wins the election.
In the rst case they are renanced, in the second they are not.
Second, core supporters see that an increased reelection probability has
value also for future periods. In addition to a higher next period static payo¤
the election of politician A has the e¤ect of an increased probability of future
nancing. This e¤ect is stronger the more core supporters that are nanced,
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as this makes the reelection probability higher. For the core supporters of
politician A it is thus good news if many poor projects are launched. This
dynamic e¤ect adds to the increased next period static payo¤, and thus
increases the reelection probability further.
Third, core supporters of the opposition politician realize that a higher
probability of reelection of the incumbent decreases the chance that they
will receive nancing of poor long-term projects in later periods. For the
core supporters of politician B it is thus bad news if many poor projects are
launched by an incumbent politician A. This dynamic e¤ect decreases the
reelection probability of the incumbent.
Note, however, that as the group of politician A and politician B core
supporters is of the same size p, these two latter dynamic e¤ects are of exactly
the same size, and the net e¤ect on the reelection probability constitutes the
rst static e¤ect of increased next period income for core supporters.
It is worth noting how the formula for (15) is inuenced by our simpli-
fying assumption that all members of both core groups have poor long-term
projects to be nanced. Imagine that only a fraction q of them did, with a
fraction z having good long-term projects and a fraction 1 q z having short-
term projects (good or bad). In this case (15) would be (l) = 1
2
+ qphEl
emphasizing that the presence of good projects does not inuence the re-
election probability.
We now proceed to show that policy l is the only long run equilibrium path
where long-term poor projects can a¤ect the reelection probability. First,
note that so far we have only assumed that politicians play the strategies
associated with policy l and drawn the implications for the reelection prob-
ability. We now need to justify that i) it is credible for an incumbent to
promise renancing of the long-term loss making projects he initiates, ii) it
is not credible for the opposition to promise to renance these projects, and
iii) no other long-term poor projects can a¤ect the reelection probability.
i) A promise by the incumbent to renance projects should he win the
election is credible. Given that he launches a project a politician will re-
nance should he win the election if Rl > 1 given that previous costs are
sunk.
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ii) A promise by the opposition to renance is not credible. Given that
Rl < 1+ renancing non-core supporters is loss making. Voters realize that
a promise of renancing should the opposition win the election is not ex post
optimal for the opposition, and hence such promises are not credible.
iii) Consider rst a poor long-term project where Rl < 1. It is not credible
for any politician to promise to renance such a project. Consider next a
poor long-term project with Rl > 1+. If launched in a period such a project
will be renanced by any politician winning power, as the investment cost
from the previous period is sunk. Hence when long-term poor projects have
Rl < 1 or Rl > 1 +  the decision to renance is independent of the election
outcome. It is then straightforward to show that the reelection probability
is 1
2
.
The following proposition is now evident:
Proposition 2 The only way for an incumbent to increase the reelection
probability by poor projects is to launch long-term projects with 1 < Rl < 1+.
Thus, launching poor projects for core supporters may be an e¢ cient
political strategy to increase the probability of reelection. Such projects
allow the incumbent to credibly promise some voters that their income will
be higher if the incumbent rather than the opposition wins the election. In
this way the incumbent is able to tie the continuation utility of some voters
to his own political success. The gain in votes from own core supporters
is higher than the loss in votes from the core supporters of the opposition
politician - the incumbent is able to utilize the advantage of deciding policy
to produce an incumbency bias.
Note, however, that for poor projects to produce an incumbency bias
they have to be su¢ ciently poor. Marginally poor projects in the sense that
1+  < Rl <
1+

do not su¢ ce to increase the reelection probability as they
will be renanced by both politicians should they win the election.
The incumbency bias rests on the fact that policy will be reversed if there
is a change in power. Much case study evidence supports this result. The
regressions in Gimpelson and Treisman (2002) shows that (p. 149) Public
employment tended to fall after the election of a new governor, who pre-
sumably trimmed the patronage appointments of his predecessor.With the
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change of political power in Ghana in 1966 Killick (1978, p. 238) notes that
the new government decided to lay o¤ nearly 40,000 redundant workers
in various state agencies.9 Barkan and Chege (1989) divide the provinces
of Kenya into the Kenyatta political base and the Moi political base, each
containing 33 per cent of the population. While expenditures on road con-
struction under Kenyatta grossly favored the Kenyatta provinces, when Moi
came to power expenditures shifted toward Moi provinces. Within one year
the share going to the Kenyatta base decreased from 44 percent to 28 percent
of the total, while the share going to the Moi base increased from 32 to 38 per-
cent of the total. In 1986, six years after the change in power, the Kenyatta
base received 16 percent of the total, while the Moi base received 67 percent.
Keefer (2002, p. 27) reports that one high o¢ cial in the ruling government
of President Hipolito Mejía of the Dominican Republic claimed that hun-
dreds of projects that were begun by the government of Joaquin Balaguer,
two governments before, were then paralyzed under the Leonel Fernández
government. Other observers noted that incomplete projects from the Fer-
nández government were similarly halted under Mejía.There is also direct
evidence that the policy of patronage indeed raises the reelection probabil-
ity. According to the analysis in Treisman (1999, p. 81) Where regional
government spending increased relatively more, the vote was subsequently
higher for Yeltsin and his reformist allies, controlling for the previous level
of regional support for them.
Whether or not he wins or loses the election, the incumbent incurs an
economic loss on poor long-term projects. However, they may still be ra-
tional to undertake because the probability of winning the election increases
and when in power the politician receives rents. Consider the incumbents
alternative strategy of not nancing projects. We term this policy 0. In this
case the per period return from winning power is independent of history and
9What rst seemed to be a shift in policy away from state enterprises towards laissez
faire, however, turned out not to be. Soon after the ratio of public to private sector em-
ployees was back to the levels seen during the Nkrumah administration, and when the NRC
came to power in 1972 Killick (1978, p. 317) reports that The government announced
its intention to reactivate various state enterprises left uncompleted or abandoned after
the overthrow of Nkrumah, but of far greater signicance for the role of the state was
the compulsory acquisition of a 55 percent shareholding in the timber, mining and oil
industries ... It seemed, then, that economic policy had become full circle. The expansion
of state control and participation begun under Nkrumah was resumed.
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given by X. V A(A; 0) is the payo¤ to politician A from winning an election,
V A(B; 0) the payo¤ to politician A from losing an election, and (0) the
reelection probability with policy 0. Then
V A(A; 0) = X + 
 
(0)V A(A; 0) + (1  (0))V A(B; 0) (16)
and
V A(B; 0) = 
 
(1  (0))V A(A; 0) + (0)V A(B; 0) : (17)
Consequently
V A(A; 0) =
(1  (0))X
1   ( + 2(0)(1  )) : (18)
Note that from (5) and (18) it follows that if (l) = (0) poor long-term
projects will never be launched (as X p+(l)p(Rl 1) is always less than
X). However, we already know that (0) = 1
2
, since when no projects are
launched after the election, the income of all voters is independent of the
election outcome. This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Poor long-term projects with 1 < Rl < 1 +  are launched
for core supporters of the incumbent if X  (1 (
1
2
+phEl))(1 ( 12+phEl)(Rl 1))
(1 )hEl .
Proof. Consider V AB (A; l) from (5) and V
A(A; 0) from (18). These both
include the rents from being in power today, the eventual costs of nancing
projects today, and the future expected utility by following policy l or 0
respectively. Since the rents from power are already secured an incumbent
will follow policy l instead of policy 0 when the net gain of doing so is positive,
i.e. V AB (A; l)   X > V A(A; 0)   X. Substitute (l) = 12 + phEl in (5) and
(0) = 1
2
in (18). Then the condition in the proposition is derived from the
inequality V AB (A; l)  V A(A; 0) after some calculation.
In the existing economics literature the soft budget constraint is viewed as
the outcome of a commitment problem; if bad projects are nanced initially
politicians cannot credibly commit not to renance them as long as returns
cover next period costs. Thus, since bad entrepreneurs know that they will
be renanced, they submit poor projects in the rst place. If politicians
knew that the projects were poor, they would never have been nanced. By
contrast, in our theory politicians nance poor projects exactly because they
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are known to be poor. This is also the result of commitment, but in our case
this is viewed as an opportunity rather than as a problem by the politicians;
by nancing bad projects for core supporters politicians can credibly commit
to renance the projects in case they win the election while the opposition
cannot.
As seen from Proposition 3 poor projects are more likely to be chosen, and
the soft budget constraint more prevalent, when the rents of being in power
X are high. Then there is more to gain by inuencing the election outcome.
This may explain why the soft budget constraint is typically a problem in
countries with bad institutional quality. In such countries the rents from
being in power may be high as politicians tend to view the state nances as
their own resources. Also, it may explain the serious problem of soft budget
constraints in natural resource abundant countries. According to Gelb (1988)
most of the windfall gains received by oil exporters after the OPEC shocks
in the 70s were invested domestically, but in ine¢ cient projects that had
little economic payo¤. Despite the massive investment, output for OPEC as
a whole has fallen by an average of 1.3 percent each year from 1965 to 1998
(Gylfason, 2001). Gavin (1993, p. 216) echoes the consensus explanation
when he notes the tendency for governments to invest in projects with high
prestige or political payo¤, but with little economic rationale.For instance,
for Nigeria Gelb (1988, p. 241) nds that public capital spending accelerated
rapidly from only 3.6 percent of non-mining GDP in 1970 to 29.5 percent by
1976. This acceleration was so strong that it alone absorbed more than the
entire increase in oil income between 1970 and 1976.(italics in original).
Also, as seen from Proposition 3, the higher is p, the more likely it is that
poor projects are nanced. The reason for this is that with many bad projects
to nance the incumbent is able to tie the continuation utility of more voters
to his own political success, making the strategy of launching bad projects
more tempting. One possible interpretation of a high p is that there is a high
degree of clientelism so that each politician has many voters that depend
on him. Thus clientelism and the soft budget constraint should be expected
to be closely interlinked. Another interpretation of a high p is simply that
it represents a situation with many low quality entrepreneurs. Thus, as in
other theories of the soft budget constraint, poor entrepreneurial capacity
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makes the problem worse. In our theory this e¤ect may be reinforced as in
such countries it is also more politically tempting to choose poor projects
to a¤ect the political equilibrium. Thus countries with little entrepreneurial
experience may be especially prone to soft budget constraints emerging as a
political strategy.
It is interesting to note that the higher is h, the more likely it is that
poor projects are nanced. Thus, the more voters care about the economy
relative to other factors, the worse economic outcomes may be. The reason
for this is that when voters care much about economic outcome, they are
easier to buy with ine¢ cient redistribution. This result contrasts with most
other theories of the e¢ ciency of electoral competition, where politicians are
more strongly inclined to adopt to e¢ cient economic policies the more the
voters care about the economy relative to other factors, see e.g. Persson and
Tabellini (2000).
Finally, note that, as we discussed earlier, the presence of good short-
term and long-term projects makes it more valuable to be in power and has
the same e¤ect as an increase in X. Thus the presence of rents from good
projects makes it more attractive for incumbents to launch bad projects.
From the above another contrast with most other political economy the-
ories follow:
Proposition 4 For poor projects policy is too long-sighted.
Proof. This follows immediately from the fact that poor short-term
projects are never nanced while poor long-term projects may be nanced
even if they have a lower return that poor short-term projects.
In most political economy theories policy is too short-sighted as politicians
discount the future return on projects by the probability that they remain
in power, which is irrelevant from the point of view of society. In our model
it is also the case that politicians discount the future by the probability they
remain in power, but despite this, policy is too long-sighted for poor projects.
The di¤erence is that in our setting long-term poor projects increase the
reelection probability while short-term poor projects do not.
Although for a di¤erent reason, the result that policy may favor long-
term projects has also been pointed out by Glazer (1989). In his model two
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e¤ects make voters choose long-term rather than short-term projects. First,
the voter that is decisive in period one may not be in period two. Thus the
decisive voter may have an incentive to choose a long-term project in period
one to make sure services are delivered also in period two. The decisive voter
in period one can thus tie the hands of voters in period two. Second, if a long-
term project is su¢ ciently e¢ cient compared to a short-term project, the
decisive voter in period one can vote for a long-term project even if his own
net utility of the project is negative. The reason is that this may be better
than risking that a short-term project will be build in period two. In contrast
to the model of Glazer we have an endogenous reelection probability, which
explains why long-term projects are chosen our model. While the decisive
voter today ties the hands of future voters in Glazers model, in our model
the decisive politician in the rst period chooses policy to tie his own hands.
And to credibly tie only his own hands and not the hands of the opposition,
long-term projects must be su¢ ciently poor. Only then can the incumbent
credibly commit to future redistribution that the opposition cannot.
The longsightedness of poor projects is interesting when compared with
the experience of Ghana that is a key motivation of our paper. A startling
example is the construction of a fruit canning factory for the production
of mango products, for which there was recognized to be no local market,
[and] which was said to exceed by some multiple the total world trade in such
items(Killick, 1978, p.229). The governments own report on this factory is
worth quoting at some length (Killick, 1978, p. 233)
Project A factory is to be erected at Wenchi, Brong Ahafo, to
produce 7,000 tons of mangoes and 5,300 tons of tomatoes per an-
num. If average yields of crops in that area will be 5 tons per acre
per annum for mangoes and 5 tons per acre for tomatoes, there
should be 1,400 acres of mangoes and 1,060 acres of tomatoes in
the eld to supply the factory.
The Problem The present supply of mangoes in the area is from
a few trees scattered in the bush and tomatoes are not grown on
commercial scale, and so the production of these crops will have
to start from scratch. Mangoes take 5-7 years from planting to
start fruiting. How to obtain su¢ cient planting materials and to
21
organize production of raw materials quickly become the major
problems of this project.
Killicks comment is that it is di¢ cult to imagine a more damning com-
mentary on the e¢ ciency of project planning stated a whole year before
the factory was constructed. Not only was it clear before the factory was
constructed that the project was poor - it would also take a long time before
the factory could be operational.10
We now turn attention from poor to good projects. We then have the
following:
Proposition 5 Long-term good projects cannot a¤ect the re-election proba-
bility.
Proof. If a long-term good project is launched in a period it will be
renanced by any politician holding power in the next period since Rl >
1+

) Rl > 1+. Thus for good long-term projects the decision to renance
is independent of the election outcome.
The decision to launch projects may di¤er between politicians. Politician
A faces a lower cost of projects to his core supporters, and vice versa for
politician B. Thus for a su¢ ciently low payo¤ of good long-term projects,
there exists an equilibrium path where politicians only launch projects for
core supporters, but projects are always renanced independent of the elec-
tion outcome.
Consider rst the case where long-term projects are su¢ ciently protable
that they will be launched by all politicians. In this case the income of
all voters in all periods is independent of the election outcome, and the
reelection probability is 1
2
. Consider next the case where politicians only
launch long-term projects toward core supporters. The decision to renance
is still the same for both politicians. Thus in any period next period income
is independent of the election outcome. Future income, however, is not.
10Other examples from Killick (1978) include the politically determined location of a
footwear factory where (p. 231) The six years it took to complete the footwear factory,
for example, was partly responsible for the obsolescence of much of its plant by the time
it was ready to go into productionor the decision to let sugar factories be supplied by
own plantations where (p. 232) The plantations were not ready when the factories were
completed, despite delays in the latter.
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Politician A core supporters will be better o¤ if politician A wins as then they
have additional projects launched in the future, and vice versa for politician
B core supporters. Politician A core supporters are thus more likely to vote
for politician A, while politician B core supporters are more likely to vote
for politician B. The point to note, however, is that these option values
are symmetric; what politician A wins among his core supporters he looses
among the politician B core supporters, and vice versa. It can be veried
that this intuition is correct by using the same techniques as those used to
prove Proposition 1 to nd that also in this case the reelection probability is
1
2
, which is the same as if no good long run projects had been nanced. The
proposition then follows.
Thus it is exactly the bad quality of poor long-term projects that makes
them politically appealing. By adopting poor projects, an incumbent ensures
that he can credibly o¤er to renance them, while the opposition cannot.
Good long-term projects do not have this asymmetric feature since all politi-
cians can credibly commit to renance them and they thus have a symmetric
e¤ect on political outcomes.
Consider now the strategy where politicians launch good long-term projects
toward their core supporters. We then have:
Proposition 6 Long-term good projects are nanced for core supporters by
the incumbent if Rl >
2+

.
Proof. By replacing (l) in (5) with 1
2
and using (18) taking into ac-
count that (0) = 1
2
the condition in the proposition follows. (Alternatively
consider the cost of p today against the expected benet of 1
2
p(Rl   1) to-
morrow, valued at  1
2
p(Rl   1) today. The inequality p <  12p(Rl   1) gives
the condition in the proposition.)
Thus the decision to launch long-term good projects is based on economic
parameters alone. This does not, however, mean that the decision is e¢ cient.
As the incumbent only has a probability of 1
2
of receiving the future payo¤
he underinvests in long-term good projects compared to the case where he is
certain to receive the future benet of the project. In this case the investment
criterion is Rl >
1+

.
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Short run projects can only be nanced if Rs > 1. In contrast to poor
projects, for good projects the following applies:
Proposition 7 For good projects policy is too short-sighted.
Proof. This follows immediately as good short-term projects can always
be nanced while good long-term projects may not be nanced even if they
have a higher expected return than good short-term projects.
This result is the standard one that follows from the fact that politicians
discount the future return on projects by the probability they remain in
power.
Finally, consider two groups of long-term projects for core supporters
that for simplicity only di¤er in their second period return; poor projects
with Rl = Rp and good projects with Rl = Rg. Assume that the two groups
of projects compete for nancing. We then have:
Proposition 8 long-term poor projects crowd out long-term good projects
when X > p+ (1 
1
2
)( 1
2
 phEl)(Rg 1) (1 ( 12+phEl))( 12+phEl)(Rp 1)
(1 )hEl .
Proof. By replacing Rl with Rp in (5) and substituting for (l), the
payo¤ from launching long-term poor projects follow. By replacing Rl with
Rg in (5) and substituting (l) with 1
2
, the payo¤ from launching long-term
good projects follow. After some calculation the condition in the proposition
then follows.
Thus when the rents of being in o¢ ce X are high and voters care a lot
about the economy relative to other factors (h is high), politicians end up
picking losers rather than winners. The standard result in models of elec-
toral competition is the opposite (see for instance the overview in Persson
and Tabellini, 2000, Chapters 3 and 4); when ego rents are high or voters
care a lot about economic e¢ ciency relative to other factors, electoral compe-
tition is sti¤er and economic ine¢ ciency reduced. In our model, by contrast,
sti¤er competition increases the political incentives to undertake ine¢ cient
redistribution which manifests itself in the soft budget constraint. Launching
poor rather than good projects is more tempting the more that is at stake
and the more responsive voters are.
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3 Concluding remarks
The conventional wisdom in the economics literature, following the seminal
paper by Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), is that the soft-budget constraint
arises because well meaning politicians face a dynamic commitment problem
- they cannot commit not to bail out bad projects ex post. Interestingly how-
ever, the preponderance of case study evidence on the soft budget constraint
links it to political incentives - rms or groups are bailed out for political
reasons. In this paper we have developed a political economy model to try to
link these insights and show how the soft budget constraint may arise as an
e¢ cient political strategy. We believe this is critical to understanding why
soft budgets are so hard to eradicate.
In an environment where politicians cannot commit to arbitrary forms of
redistribution the presence of the sort of commitment problem isolated by
Dewatripont and Maskin may be politically advantageous because it allows
politicians to deliver benets to potential supporters. While in standard the-
ories of the soft budget constraint politicians would never nance a project
known to be poor, in our theory this is exactly the reason it is nanced in
the rst place because it is the only way to deliver redistribution which can
inuence electoral outcomes. This follows because of linkages between politi-
cians and certain groups, who we call their core constituencies. Such linkages
create asymmetries in what politicians can promise to di¤erent groups. In
particular politicians will only bail out poor projects operated by their own
core groups and this heightens the desire of the core group to see them elected.
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